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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you manage an Australian pharmaceutical company.
Because your patent permitting the sale of diabetes medication in Australia
will expire in one year, you look to sell your product in Japan. Unfamiliar
with the Japanese market, you enter into a co-promotion agreement with
Beta, a Belgian pharmaceutical company with extensive experience in Japan.
Wary of litigating in a foreign, civil law jurisdiction, your counsel
recommends that you include an arbitration clause in your co-promotion
agreement, which you adopt.
Six months after the conclusion of the agreement, you suspect that Beta
has not lived up to its promotional obligations, as Japanese doctors are not
prescribing your medication. Pursuant to the agreement, you commence
arbitration in London. Fortunately, the arbitration produces an award
requiring Beta to pay you hundreds of millions of dollars. Seeking the
money you are due under the award, you bring an action to enforce the
award before a Belgian court. To your surprise, the Belgian court, rather
than summarily enforcing the award, agrees to hear a counterclaim that Beta
raises against you. This counterclaim protracts the litigation, and by the
time you defeat the counterclaim and prevail in the action, Beta has
transferred its assets out of Belgium.
After an exhaustive search, you find enough of Beta’s assets in the
United States to satisfy the award against Beta. Moreover, your counsel
indicates that American courts will refuse to hear any counterclaims that
Beta might raise in any enforcement proceedings. You therefore bring an
enforcement action in U.S. federal court. To your dismay, the court
dismisses your claim as time-barred by the Federal Arbitration Act’s threeyear statute of limitations. Your foray into international commerce
decisively stymied, you resign yourself to developing a new drug to
distribute in Australia.
The difficulties faced by the fictional Australian pharmaceutical
company above mirror the obstacles that real parties encounter when trying
to enforce rights secured through international arbitration. These
difficulties stem from the fact that countries have enacted different barriers
to the enforcement of international arbitral awards.1 These cross-national
1 See Teresa Cheng, Celebrating the Fiftieth Anniversary of the New York Convention (noting that
attempts to enforce the same award in different jurisdictions have produced inconsistent
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differences in barriers persist today, despite the fact that the New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards of 1958 (“New York Convention” or “Convention”) attempted to
eliminate such differences.2 Through the New York Convention, the
international community sought to limit and standardize the grounds on
which countries could refuse to enforce arbitral awards.3
The lack of international uniformity does not arise because countries
that have ratified the New York Convention are intentionally violating the
treaty; rather, the problem lies within the treaty itself—the New York
Convention contains a choice of law problem. It establishes that two sets of
laws will govern actions to enforce international arbitration awards: its own
provisions and the national laws of state-parties.4 National courts have
adopted traditional choice of law methods in order to choose whether they
will use their own national laws or the treaty provisions to decide a
particular issue. However, this divergence has brought to enforcement
actions the same two problems it has brought to other more conventional
civil litigations—absurd and nonuniform outcomes. The lack of uniformity
is particularly vexing, as the New York Convention’s very purpose was to
ensure the uniform treatment of a given arbitration award across countries.
This Comment proposes that just as courts have abandoned the
traditional choice of law approach in conventional litigation, they should
also abandon it in arbitral enforcement litigation. Courts should instead use
modern choice of law doctrine. Employing modern choice of law doctrine to
enforcement actions would produce sensible results and bring uniformity to
the enforcement of international arbitral awards. This Comment focuses on
the United States and the Federal Arbitration Act as a case study.5 It
suggests that applying modern American choice of law doctrine to the
Federal Arbitration Act, mainly by limiting the application of the statute of
limitations contained in section 207 of the Act, would help the United
States better implement the New York Convention.
Part I of this Comment sets out the background, purpose, and provisions
of the New York Convention. Part II uncovers the choice of law problem
embedded in the treaty, and in the Federal Arbitration Act that implements
outcomes), in 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 679, 683 (Albert Jan van den Berg
ed., 2009).
2 June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38; see also Cheng, supra note 1, at 679 (“It is trite
and well recognized that the grounds upon which parties can rely to resist enforcement have been
exhaustively listed in Art. V [of the New York Convention].”).
3 See New York Convention, supra note 2, art. V.
4 Id., art. III.
5 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208 (2012) (implementing the New York Convention).
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the treaty in the United States. Part III describes the traditional choice of
law approach and demonstrates that the adoption of this approach in
implementing the New York Convention has brought about absurd and
nonuniform consequences. Part IV suggests moving to a modern choice of
law approach. Focusing on the United States and the Federal Arbitration
Act, it offers three variants of modern American choice of law doctrine:
interest analysis, Erie analysis, and Reverse-Erie analysis. These variants all
call for either restricting the scope of the statute of limitations found in the
Federal Arbitration Act, or subordinating it in favor of the statute of
limitations found in the New York Convention itself. The use of a modern
choice of law approach would allow the United States in particular, and stateparties in general, to effectuate the purpose of the Convention, and restore
uniformity to the enforcement of international arbitral awards worldwide.
I. BACKGROUND, PURPOSE, AND PROVISIONS OF THE NEW YORK
CONVENTION
A successor to the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign
Arbitral Awards,6 the New York Convention has been described as “the most
effective instance of international legislation in the entire history of
commercial law.”7 The treaty’s success is further substantiated by the
representative worldwide participation in it: 149 nations have ratified it,8
including “all parts of the world [with] many different levels of commerce
and development[, and a]lmost all the major international trading nations.”9
This near-universal participation is made all the more remarkable when one
considers that the Convention undertakes the controversial endeavor of
limiting countries’ judicial sovereignty. For example, no treaty regarding
the enforcement of foreign court judgments has achieved comparable

6 Sept. 26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 302. For a discussion of the problems in this predecessor treaty,
see Robert Briner and Virginia Hamilton, The History and General Purpose of the Convention: The
Creation of an International Standard to Ensure the Effectiveness of Arbitration Agreements and Foreign
Arbitral Awards, in ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRAL AWARDS: THE NEW YORK CONVENTION IN PRACTICE 3, 6-11 (Emmanuel
Gaillard & Domenico di Pietro eds., 2008).
7 Michael John Mustill, Arbitration: History and Background, 6 J. INT’L A RB. 43, 49 (1989).
8 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, UNITED NATIONS
TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails. aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=
XXII-1&chapter=22&lang=en [http://perma.cc/YUQ2-94YG] (last updated Oct. 6, 2015) (listing
the countries that have signed or ratified the New York Convention).
9 Joseph T. McLaughlin & Laurie Genevro, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Under the New
York Convention—Practice in U.S. Courts, 3 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 249, 251 (1986).
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participation.10 Yet, the vast majority of states have decided to sacrifice some
degree of judicial sovereignty in the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
States sacrifice such sovereignty in return for the economic and
reputational benefits conferred by accession to the New York Convention. A
state that joins the treaty signals to the international business community
that it is a hospitable forum where businesses may resolve their disputes,11
particularly since the Convention allows state-parties to limit their
enforcement of awards only to those awards made in the territory of other
state-parties.12 Even putative states accede to the Convention,13 suggesting
that membership in the treaty legitimizes a state’s claim to a place not just
in the international business community, but also in the community of
states more broadly.
The Convention’s purpose is to bring uniformity and efficiency to the
enforcement of international arbitration awards.14 For example, the U.S.
10 See Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294
(mandating that state parties enforce in their courts judgments given by courts of other state
parties in cases arising out of contracts with an exclusive choice of court agreement). This treaty
has been ratified only by Mexico and members of the European Union (except for Denmark), and
signed by the United States and Singapore. Status Table: Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of
Court Agreements, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIV. INT’L L., http://www.hcch.net/index_en.
php?act=conventions.status2&cid=98 [http://perma.cc/BZ4A-PA6Z] (last updated June 19, 2015)
(listing the countries that have signed or ratified the Hague Convention).
11 See New York Convention, supra note 2, art. III (mandating that state-parties enforce
arbitral awards brought before their courts); Gerold Herrmann, The 1958 New York Convention: Its
Objectives and Its Future (stating that the availability of dispute resolution has proven to be “the
single most convincing reason for adherence” to the Convention in the author’s conversations with
representatives of non-signatory states), in IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS AND AWARDS: 40 YEARS OF APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 15, 18
(Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 1999). The influence of the Convention does not stop with accession,
as states that have acceded typically modify the rest of their national arbitration legislation to
conform to the pro-arbitration framework established by the Convention. Briner & Hamilton,
supra note 6, at 20.
12 New York Convention, supra note 2, art. I. Nearly two-thirds of state-parties have availed
themselves of this right, known as the “reciprocity reservation.” GARY B. BORN,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.02[G] (2012).
13 See, e.g., Alison Ross, Palestine Accedes to the New York Convention, GLOBAL ARB. REV.
(Jan. 7, 2015), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/33283/palestine-accedes-new-yorkconvention/ [http://perma.cc/ANZ4-EXKJ] (noting that Palestine, which is “not universally
recognised as a sovereign state,” acceded to the New York Convention).
14 See Rory Brady, Comments on a New York Convention for the Next Fifty Years (assuming that
the New York Convention’s “twin goals of efficiency and uniformity in the enforcement of
international arbitration awards are probably shared by everybody”), in 50 YEARS OF THE NEW
YORK CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 708, 708; see also Albert Jan van den Berg, Striving for
Uniform Interpretation (noting that at the time the Convention was concluded, delegates believed
that the text and structure ensured uniformity), in ENFORCING ARBITRATION AWARDS
UNDER THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: EXPERIENCE AND P ROSPECTS 41, 41 (United
Nations 1999).
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Supreme Court has stated that the Convention seeks to “encourage the
recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in
international contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to
arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory
countries.”15 The Convention looks to national courts to achieve its purpose.
It “mobilises national courts as enforcement agencies while simultaneously
restricting their scope of national judicial supervision over international
arbitration awards.”16
There are three key provisions that collectively achieve this simultaneous
“mobilization and restriction,” or in other words, that simultaneously create
and limit the authority of national courts to enforce awards.
First, Article III mobilizes (creates authority for) national courts to
enforce international arbitration awards by requiring them to enforce such
awards: “Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding
and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory
where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the
following articles.”17 The next two articles then restrict national courts’
scope of “supervision over international arbitration awards” by respectively
limiting the evidence and substantive defenses national courts may consider
in enforcement proceedings.18 Article IV sets out the evidentiary
requirements of enforcement proceedings. The requirements are minimal: a
party seeking enforcement need only provide (a) the authenticated original
or certified copy of the award, and (b) the original arbitration agreement
pursuant to which the award was made.19
Article V then lays out the seven exhaustive defenses that permit, but do
not require, a court to refuse to enforce an award:
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request
of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the
competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought,
proof that:
(a) [The arbitration agreement was invalid due to incapacity of the
parties or otherwise under the law governing the arbitration agreement]; or
(b) [The award debtor lacked notice or an opportunity to be heard]; or

15
16

Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1973).
Michael Reisman, Preface to ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS, supra note 6, at 1, 1. This combination has been described
as the “genius” of the Convention. Id.
17 New York Convention, supra note 2, art. III (emphasis added).
18 Reisman, supra note 16, at 1.
19 See New York Convention, supra note 2, art. IV.
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(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling
within the terms of the submission to arbitration . . . ; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure
was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties [or of the law of the
country where the arbitration took place]; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been
set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or
under the law of which, that award was made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if
the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement
is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is [non-arbitrable]; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to
the public policy of that country.20

These provisions achieve efficiency by limiting the evidence and issues
that courts may consider, thereby turning enforcement actions into
summary proceedings.21 They achieve uniformity by standardizing the
grounds on which national courts may refuse to recognize awards. Indeed,
the international community standardized the grounds for nonenforcement
in Article V because it thought that standardized international rules are
preferable to the various grounds for refusal that were found in signatories’
domestic laws prior to the creation of the Convention, since “mechanical
application of domestic arbitral law to foreign awards . . . would seriously
undermine finality and regularly produce conflicting judgments.”22

20
21

Id. art. V (emphasis added).
See Zeiler v. Deitsch, 500 F.3d 157, 169 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Confirmation under the [New
York] Convention is a summary proceeding in nature, which is not intended to involve complex
factual determinations, other than a determination of the limited statutory conditions for
confirmation or grounds for refusal to confirm.”); Diapulse Corp. of Am. v. Carba, Ltd., 626 F.2d
1108, 1110 (2d Cir. 1980) (“The purpose of arbitration is to permit a relatively quick and
inexpensive resolution of contractual disputes by avoiding the expense and delay of extended court
proceedings. Accordingly, it is a well-settled proposition that judicial review of an arbitration
award should be, and is, very narrowly limited.” (internal citations omitted)); Evergreen Sys., Inc.
v. Geotech Lizenz AG, 697 F. Supp. 1254, 1257 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (“[T]he [New York] Convention
envisions a summary disposition of the issues where the relief sought is to be denied only if the
party resisting enforcement shows that one of the specific grounds stated in the Convention for
non-enforcement exists.”).
22 Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194, 197 n.2 (2d Cir. 1999).
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II. THE NEW YORK CONVENTION AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION
ACT EACH CONTAIN WITHIN THEM A CHOICE OF LAW PROBLEM
Choice of law problems arise when different laws attach different
consequences to the same set of facts.23 The different laws need not come
from different sovereigns, as a choice of law involves just that—a clash of
legal rules, not legal systems.24 A court confronting a choice of law problem
has a two-step process for resolving it.25 First, the court must decide
whether all of the different laws do in fact attach consequences—that is,
establish rights or obligations—to the facts. Second, if more than one law
attaches consequences, the court must decide which should prevail.
The New York Convention presents such a choice of law problem.
Article III provides that “[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize arbitral
awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of
the territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in
the following articles.”26
Thus, this provision establishes that two sets of laws will govern actions
in national courts to enforce arbitral awards: (1) the rules of procedure of
the national courts, and (2) the “conditions laid down in the following
articles,” referring to Articles IV and V of the Convention itself,
respectively establishing evidentiary requirements and grounds for refusal.27
23 See Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 2448, 2465 (1999) (defining a conflict of laws as a situation involving “rights created by
different laws,” such as when the plaintiff asserts a right derived from one law, and the defendant
counters with a right (or privilege against liability) derived from another).
24 Larry Kramer, More Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 24 CORNELL
INT’L. L.J. 245, 252 (1991); see also id. at 250-52 (presenting a hypothetical conflict between two
“vehicular collision” statutes from the same jurisdiction as potentially applicable to a passenger
struck by a vehicle on an on-ramp); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
277, 283 (1990) (“[T]he assumption that choice of law problems arise only in multistate cases is
erroneous.”).
25 See KERMIT ROOSEVELT, III, C ONFLICT OF LAWS 1 (2d ed. 2010) (describing the two
steps as, first, establishing the scope of the various applicable laws, and, second, devising a rule of
priority to choose one law over the others); Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, supra note 24, at 285
(noting that “[c]hoosing between [two] laws requires a two-step process,” first, interpreting each
law in isolation, and then choosing between them in the event that both give the plaintiff a right to
recover); Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 982 (1991) (“This approach
[to resolving choice of law disputes] consists of two steps: a first step to determine whether there
is a conflict, and a second step to resolve conflicts on the basis of ‘policy-selecting rules.’”).
26 New York Convention, supra note 2, art. III (emphasis added).
27 Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: An Overview (“[A] clear
distinction is made between the conditions for enforcement in respect of which the Convention
alone is controlling and the procedure for enforcement in respect of which the procedural law of
the forum governs.”), in ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS, supra note 6, at 39, 54; Emilia Onyema, Formalities of the
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These two sets of laws may conflict. In other words, they may attach
different consequences to the same enforcement action. More specifically, a
national procedural rule may require a court to dismiss a claim for
enforcement, while Article V, which calls for enforcement in the absence of
any enumerated ground for refusal, may require the award to be enforced.
This situation commonly arises with national statutes of limitations that bar
enforcement actions. For example, the Federal Arbitration Act is the
implementing legislation28 for the Convention in the United States.29 Section
207 of the Act provides a statute of limitations of three years for enforcement
actions.30 However, Article V of the Convention omits any limitations period
from its exhaustive list of grounds for refusal of enforcement; this omission
may be recast as establishing an indefinite time period in which enforcement
may be sought.31 Thus, if a claim to enforce an award comes before an
American court more than three years after the award was made, the court
must choose between the three-year limitations period in section 207, and the
indefinite limit in Article V of the Convention.
How a court should solve this problem, in other words which law it
should apply to the issue of time limits for seeking enforcement, has
attracted “surprisingly little debate” among arbitration practitioners and

Enforcement Procedure (Article III and IV) (highlighting the “distinction between the conditions for
recognition and enforcement of a final award controlled by its Article IV and the procedure for
[doing so], controlled by the procedural law of the relevant Contracting State [per Article III]”), in
ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS, supra
note 6, at 597, 597.
28 The New York Convention is not self-executing in the United States. It becomes part of
American domestic law only if it is expressly incorporated therein through a statute, known as
“implementing legislation.” See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 111(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“Courts in the United States are bound to give
effect to international law and to international agreements of the United States, except that a ‘nonself-executing’ agreement will not be given effect as law in the absence of necessary
implementation.”).
29 See 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (“The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, shall be enforced in United States courts in accordance
with this chapter.”).
30 See 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2012) (“Within three years after an arbitral award falling under the
Convention is made, any party to the arbitration may apply to any court having jurisdiction under
this chapter for an order confirming the award as against any other party to the arbitration.”).
31 See New York Convention, supra note 2, art. V (detailing an exhaustive list of grounds for
refusal of enforcement that does not include a limitations period); see also GARY B. BORN,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 26.07 (2d ed. 2014) (“An argument can be made
that the application of national statutes of limitations to Convention awards violates the Convention,
by imposing a ground for non-recognition that is not permitted by Article V of the Convention.
Nonetheless, the few national courts to consider this argument have rejected it . . . .”). The reasoning
of such national court decisions is described and critiqued infra, Section III.B.
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scholars.32 This Comment proposes that American courts use choice of law
doctrine to resolve this choice of law problem.
The existing choice of law rule for federal laws, however, does not
resolve this problem. International law is considered part of domestic
federal law,33 and, in a conflict between two federal laws, the subsequently
enacted rule prevails.34 The typical conflict arises between a treaty and a
separate, subsequently enacted statute. For example, in Breard v. Greene, a
federal statute enacted in 1996,35 which provided that a habeas petitioner
waived her right to contact her consulate if she failed to assert this right in
state court, prevailed over Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations of 1971,36 which provided that a detainee retains the right to
contact her consulate.37 The Court’s holding rested on the fact that the
statute was the subsequently enacted rule, and therefore controlled.38
The conflict of laws in arbitral enforcement actions before American
courts differs from the typical conflict of laws situation involving
international law, in that the conflict in enforcement actions is not between
a treaty and a separate, subsequently enacted statute. Instead, because the
New York Convention contains an internal conflict, this conflict carries over
to national statutes that implement the Convention. Thus, the federal
conflict discussed in this Comment is embedded within the Federal
Arbitration Act. Section 207 of the Act provides that
[w]ithin three years after an arbitral award falling under the Convention is
made, any party to the arbitration may apply to any court having
jurisdiction under this chapter for an order confirming the award as against
any other party to the arbitration. The court shall confirm the award unless it
32 Ank A. Santens, Difficulties Enforcing New York Convention Awards in the U.S. Against Non-U.S.
Defendants: Is the Culprit Jurisprudence on Jurisdiction, the Three-Year Time Bar in the Federal Arbitration Act,
or Both?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Dec. 23, 2009), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/12/23/
difficulties-enforcing-new-york-convention-awards-in-the-us-against-non-us-defendants-is-the-culpritjurisprudence-on-jurisdiction-the-three-year-time-bar-in-the-federal-arbitration-act-or-bot/
[http://
perma.cc/WLB2-HTD4].
33 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and
must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction . . . .”);
Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1555 (1984)
(recognizing that while international law became part of “our law” with U.S. independence in 1776,
the fact “[t]hat it is part of federal, not state, law has been recognized only recently”).
34 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (“[A treaty] can be
deemed . . . only the equivalent of a legislative act, to be repealed or modified at the pleasure of
Congress. In either case the last expression of the sovereign will must control.”).
35 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012).
36 Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
37 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998).
38 Id.
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finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the
award specified in the said Convention.39

The two emphasized portions conflict with each other. The first three
words of the provision establish a three-year statute of limitations. Yet, the
second portion expressly incorporates Article V of the Convention,
including the implied indefinite statute of limitations in the article.
There are two possible explanations for the origins of this conflict. First,
Congress may have explicitly intended to pass a statute inconsistent with
the Convention, and have intended that the explicit three-year limitations
period in the statute would prevail over the implicit indefinite limit in the
Convention. If this were the case, then the present analysis would end.
However, the legislative history behind the Federal Arbitration Act
suggests that a second explanation is more likely: Congress did not intend to
violate the Convention, but rather did so unwittingly by misinterpreting it.
Three parts of the legislative history reinforce this notion. First, “[f]or the
effective implementation of the Convention,”40 Congress exempted
enforcement actions from the jurisdictional and venue requirements of
other civil actions: section 203 of the Federal Arbitration Act was amended
to explicitly state that federal courts would have jurisdiction over
enforcement actions “regardless of the amount in controversy;”41 likewise,
section 204 was amended to allow the district that includes the parties’
designated “place of arbitration,” if such place is within the United States,
to serve as the venue for the enforcement action,42 even though the place of
arbitration would not fall within any of the venue provisions for other civil
actions.43 Second, Congress similarly modified already existing grounds for
refusal in order to comply with the treaty: the Federal Arbitration Act that
predated the Convention originally did not include “incapacity of the
parties” as a ground for refusal, while New York Convention Article V(1)(a)
did.44 Congress decided that “[t]o avoid any possible conflict section 207
[would] provide that the refusal and deferral clauses of the Convention are
39
40
41
42
43

9 U.S.C. § 207 (2012) (emphases added).
S. REP. NO. 91-702, at 7 (1970).
9 U.S.C. § 203 (2012).
9 U.S.C. § 204 (2012).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2012) (establishing as possible venues for civil actions the place of the
defendant’s residence, the place where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim
occurred, or any place where the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction).
44 Before the United States ratified the New York Convention, its domestic arbitration law, 9
U.S.C. §§ 1–14, governed enforcement of awards made through both domestic and international
arbitration. Section 10, which laid out the grounds on which the district court could refuse to
enforce an award, did not explicitly include “incapacity of the parties.” 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1952).

218

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 164: 207

controlling.”45 And third, Congress felt that the Convention did not
prohibit it from adding a statute of limitations for enforcement actions; it
interpreted the Convention as being “silent” on the topic.46 This Comment
rests on the premise that Congress’s interpretation of the New York
Convention was erroneous, as it overlooks the “only if ” language in Article
V that makes clear that the list of grounds on which a court would decline to
enforce an award is exhaustive.
Congress’s addition of a statute of limitations inconsistent with Article
V of the Convention was not, therefore, an intentional attempt to violate
the Convention. Where Congress has intended for its implementing
legislation to be inconsistent with a treaty, it has been explicit, as seen in the
implementing legislation for the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works.47 By contrast, Congress attempted to do what
it thought was permitted by the New York Convention. But in doing so, it
unwittingly created a conflict with the Convention.
Because the conflict is within a single statute, the later-in-time conflict of
laws rule for federal laws does not solve the conflict in this case. Therefore
this Comment will analyze the New York Convention and Federal
Arbitration Act through conflict of law approaches used to decide conflicts
among states, and among states and the federal government: the traditional
approach of substance–procedure characterization, and the modern
approaches of interest analysis, Erie analysis, and reverse-Erie analysis.
While the traditional approach is the most widely used by courts around the
world, its use has created foreseeable problems of absurd results,
unpredictability, and nonuniformity. The latter problem is particularly
vexing in the context of arbitral awards, since the New York Convention was
45
46
47

S. REP. NO. 91-702, at 8 (1970).
Id. (“The [New York] Convention does not contain any specific provision on this point.”).
Article 6 of the Berne Convention provided that an author of a work would retain all
moral rights to object to distortions of her work, even if the author had already ceded all economic
rights to the work. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9
1886, S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. Congress’s implementing legislation, the Berne
Convention Implementation Act, contains no protection of moral rights; it explicitly precludes
parties from relying on the moral rights protections found in the treaty before American courts.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“[The Berne Convention is] not self-executing.”); see also Berne
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 3(b), 102 Stat. 2853, 2853 (“The
provisions of the Berne Convention, the adherence of the United States thereto, and satisfaction
of United States obligations thereunder, do not expand or reduce any right of an author . . . to
object to any distortion . . . [of] the work.”). Indeed, Congress was reluctant to embrace the
concept of “moral rights,” and as such intended to take a “minimalist approach to compliance” with
the treaty on this issue. MARGRETH BARRETT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 196 (2d ed. 2008);
ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF C REATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS
LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 30 (2010).
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enacted to bring uniformity to the enforcement of awards. The modern
approaches by contrast would avoid these problems and would be more
faithful to congressional intent to ensure maximum compliance with the
Convention, because the modern approaches would limit the scope of the
three-year limitations period in favor of the indefinite limitations period
contained in the Convention.
III. TRADITIONAL APPROACH
A. Summary of Approach
The traditional choice of law approach established rigid rules that
determined which laws governed particular types of issues. The goals of the
rules-based system were to ensure uniformity and predictability in the type
of law to be applied.48 It achieved this goal by first characterizing the issue,
and then localizing the law that would govern the issue. Most pertinently,
the approach stipulated that the forum court would determine whether the
issue was one of substance or procedure49 (characterization). If the issue was
one of procedure, the forum law would apply; if it was one of substance,
foreign law would apply50 (localization). Essentially, these rules chose the
jurisdiction whose law would apply, not the particular law that would
actually apply.51
However, the traditional approach was criticized on two fronts: (1) its
rigidity led to absurd results, and (2) the judicial use of “escape devices”
undermined the predictability and uniformity sought by the approach.
Turning first to absurd results, the rigidity of the rules resulted in the
parties’ rights being determined by the laws of a jurisdiction with only a
“fortuitous” connection to the dispute. In the case of the substance–
procedure rule, the law to be applied was determined by the “fortuitous
circumstance” of the choice of forum by the plaintiff.52 The traditional
approach characterized the competing laws without taking into account

48 William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1963)
(defining predictability as the ability of parties to know in advance what law will govern their
conduct, and uniformity as the outcome that the same law would be applied regardless of the
forum of litigation).
49 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 584 (A M. LAW INST. 1934).
50 Id. § 585.
51 Aaron D. Twerski & Renee G. Mayer, Toward a Pragmatic Solution of Choice of law
Problems—At the Interface of Substance and Procedure, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 781, 784-85 n.16 (1979)
(describing the traditional approach as being composed of “jurisdiction-selecting rules”).
52 Baxter, supra note 48, at 19.
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their purposes and the context in which they were being applied.53 In the
case of the substance–procedure rule, a law could be procedural in one
context but substantive in another; denying this relativity of language with a
blanket characterization for all contexts has, in the words of one author, “all
the tenacity of original sin.”54 For example, a statute of limitations may be
characterized as “procedural” because it is seen to affect the remedy rather
than the right;55 however, applying the forum’s statute of limitations in a
specific context could lead to a party being left without a remedy, which is
the equivalent of not having a right at all.56 Even the rules-based European
approach noted that “characterization” must be made “according to the
particular nature of the relationship in question”—therefore, a claim would
be characterized differently for choice of law purposes than it would be
characterized in codes.57 Realizing the absurd results stemming from rigid
methods of characterization, scholars58 and judges59 proposed methods of
characterization that took into account the purpose and context of the
competing laws.

53 See David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 173-76
(1933) (arguing that the traditional method wrongly ignored the content of competing rules of
law); Joseph William Singer, Facing Real Conflicts, 24 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 197, 201 (1991)
(“Territorial rules are arbitrary because they do not require analysis of . . . policies.”).
54 Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333,
337 (1933). Cook also emphasized that the basis for classification between substance and procedure
must depend on some purpose, as opposed to “mechanistic jurisprudence.” Id. at 339, 356 (“[N]o
intelligent conclusion can be reached in any particular case until the fundamental purpose for which
the classification is being made is taken into consideration.” (emphasis added)).
55 H. L. McClintock, Distinguishing Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 78 U. PA.
L. REV. 933, 934 (1930).
56 See E. G. L., Comment, The Statute of Limitations and the Conflict of Laws, 28 YALE L.J.
492, 496 (1919) (“A right which can be enforced no longer by an action at law is shorn of its most
valuable attribute.”).
57 Bernard Audit, A Continental Lawyer Looks at Contemporary American Choice-of-law
Principles, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 589, 591 (1979); see also Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, Realism and
Revolution in Conflict of Laws, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1919, 1933 (2015) (noting that European systems
“re-form[ed]” the traditional model in order to “adapt local choice rules to local values and
changing circumstances,” among them the increasingly technological and interconnected world).
58 See, e.g., RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF L AWS 62-63
(6th ed. 2010) (proposing a characterization method that balances “difficulty to the forum in
finding and applying the foreign rule against the likelihood that the rule will affect the outcome in
a manner that will invite forum shopping”).
59 See Bournias v. Atlantic Mar. Co., 220 F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 1955) (proposing a specificity
test, by which a statute of limitations would be characterized as substantive if it were specifically
aimed at a newly created right, and procedural if it applied generally to all rights). In this case,
then-Judge Harlan found that the statute of limitations, which applied to the entire Panamanian
labor code, was not specifically aimed at claims for unpaid wages and was thus procedural. See id.
at 156-57.
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The second criticism of the traditional approach was that it enabled
courts to use escape devices, which undermined the uniformity and
predictability goals of the traditional approach.60 Critics argued that courts
would employ results-oriented decisionmaking; in other words, they would
characterize an issue as “procedural” if they wanted to apply their own law
to it, but “substantive” if they wanted to apply foreign law. Frequent use of
such escape devices rendered the term “procedural” devoid of any
independent meaning: indeed, one casebook suggests that describing an
issue as “procedural” is merely “shorthand” for noting that forum law will be
applied to it;61 another treatise calls the substance–procedure classification a
“gimmick” used to determine which law will apply.62 These criticisms could
apply with equal force to the application of the traditional approach to the
enforcement of international arbitral awards.
B. Application of the Traditional Approach to the New York Convention
and the Federal Arbitration Act
The New York Convention most obviously enshrines the traditional
choice of law approach. The forum (a national court) supplies procedural
rules, while the Convention supplies the “substantive” conditions for
enforcement in Articles IV and V.63 Courts have unwaveringly adopted this
approach: in deciding the question of whether the forum’s statute of
limitations or the Convention’s indefinite limitations period applies, they
have characterized statute of limitations as “procedural” and applied the
forum’s (i.e., their own) statute of limitations.64 In so characterizing
limitations periods, courts rely on statements by arbitration scholars that

60 See Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J.
171, 175 (describing the traditional method as “loaded with escape devices,” the use of which
“introduce[s] a very serious element of uncertainty and unpredictability”); Nicholas deBelleville
Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and
International Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087, 1106 (1956) (decrying the abuse by courts of escape devices,
especially the “public policy” escape device).
61 WILLIAM M. R ICHMAN, WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS & CHRISTOPER A. W HYTOCK,
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS § 58 (4th ed. 2013).
62 PETER HAY, P ATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 3.5 (5th ed. 2010).
63 FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
para. 1669 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999).
64 See Ank A. Santens, supra note 32 (“It is often assumed without discussion that limitation
periods are among the local ‘rules of procedure’ contemplated in Article III of the New York
Convention.”).
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time limits could fit within the Article III “rules of procedure”;65 some
courts have also engaged in treaty interpretation of Article III themselves.66
However, adherence to the traditional distinction has caused the same
problems of absurd results and nonuniformity in enforcement actions as the
traditional approach did in other choice of law contexts.67
Recall that the term “absurd results” refers to an outcome where the
parties’ rights are determined by the law of a jurisdiction with only a
“fortuitous” connection to their dispute. In enforcement actions, the
“fortuitous” connection is the presence of the award debtor’s assets in the
enforcing jurisdiction, given that the location of the award debtor’s assets
almost always determines where the plaintiff seeks enforcement.68
Moreover, just as the use of a blanket “right–remedy” distinction to
characterize between substance and procedure inappropriately ignores the
reality that a right without a remedy ceases to be a right—a reality that has
been recognized by at least one international trade tribunal69—the
65 ALFRED JAN VAN DEN B ERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958
240 (1981) (labeling time limits as aspects “incidental to the enforcement” and therefore
procedural, along with discovery, set-off, and estoppel).
66 Yugraneft Corp. v. Rexx Mgmt. Corp., [2010] S.C.R. 649, 661-63 (Can.) (analyzing
explicitly the issue of whether Article III, as interpreted by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, can encompass statute of limitations).
67 The leading treatise in arbitration summarizes why simple substance–procedure
characterization is complicated and inappropriate in the context of the Convention:

Article III’s reference to “rules of procedure” is not easily interpreted, in the context
of a global convention, as a reference to statutes of limitations. Consistent with most
conflict of laws characterizations, time limitations on the right to enforce an award are
more easily interpreted as “substantive” and not a “rule” of “procedure.”
Nevertheless, it is difficult to accept the notion that the Convention meant to
prohibit all national time limitations on the recognition of awards, without
substituting any international standard [explicitly in the text].
BORN, supra note 31, § 26.07.
68 See, e.g., BORN, supra note 12, § 17.06 (“For the award-holder, the most important factor in
enforcing an award will usually be the location of identifiable, unencumbered assets of the adverse
party . . . .”); JULIAN D. M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & STEFAN MICHAEL KRÖLL, COMPARATIVE
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION para. 26-57 (2003) (“Enforcement proceedings are
possible more or less everywhere assets are located.”); William W. Park & Alexander A. Yanos,
Treaty Obligations and National Law: Emerging Conflicts in International Arbitration, 58 HASTINGS
L.J. 251, 260 (2006) (“Enforcement would normally be sought by the winning claimant, looking to
attach the respondent’s assets.”).
69 In 1989, a GATT dispute settlement panel ruled on whether section 337 of the United
States Tariff Act was inconsistent with the United States’ obligations under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Panel Report, United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
L/6439 (Jan. 16, 1989), GATT BISD (36th Supp.), at 345 (1989). Section 337 provided that
imported goods alleged to infringe United States patents could be challenged before the United
States International Trade Commission (ITC). See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012). Since domestically
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distinction in the arbitration context similarly ignores the truism that an
arbitration award that cannot be enforced in the only jurisdiction containing
the award debtor’s assets is nothing more than a “piece of paper.”70 In other
words, the application of a local statute of limitations may deprive the award
creditor not only of a remedy (enforcement before national courts), but also of a
right (the contents of the award).
These absurd results are borne out empirically.71 In over half of the
enforcement actions that were brought before American courts and were
dismissed as time-barred, the only connection the parties had with the
United States was the enforcement litigation. For example, Seetransport
Wiking Trader Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MbH & Co., Kommanditgesellschaft v.
Navimpex Centrala Navala involved a dispute between German and
Romanian corporations whose arbitration had been conducted in Paris
subject to French law,72 while AO Techsnabexport v. Globe Nuclear Services and
Supply involved a dispute between a Russian entity and a company
headquartered in Russia (but nominally incorporated in America), whose
produced goods alleged to infringe United States patents could not be challenged before the ITC,
but only before federal district courts, a question arose as to whether section 337 was inconsistent
with the United States’ obligations to accord to imported goods “treatment no less favourable than
that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and
requirements . . . .” General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. III(4), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. In finding section 337 inconsistent with Article III(4), the panel dismissed the
United States’ arguments that the phrase “laws” in the Article referred only to substantive laws:
In the Panel’s view, enforcement procedures cannot be separated from the substantive
provisions they serve to enforce. If the procedural provisions of internal law were not
covered by Article III:4, contracting parties could escape the national treatment
standard by enforcing substantive law, itself meeting the national treatment standard,
through procedures less favourable to imported products than to like products of
national origin. The interpretation suggested by the United States would therefore
defeat the purpose of Article III . . . .
Panel Report, United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, ¶ 5.10, L/6439 (Jan. 16, 1989),
GATT BISD (36th Supp.), at 345, 383 (1989) (emphasis added).
70 See ALAN REDFERN ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
¶ 9.84 (5th ed. 2009) (“If an award cannot be enforced, it is worth no more than a bargaining chip.”);
Randall Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts: An Empirical Study of Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the
PRC, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 249 (2001) (“Parties want money, not a piece of paper.”).
71 For a collection of enforcement case law, see Topic List of Court Decisions on the New York
Convention, N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/court-decisions/list-oftopics-decisions-per-topic [http://perma.cc/EUD3-TX47] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015). While the
number of cases is low, this number does not account for the number of award creditors who were
deterred from bringing actions in American courts because of the statute of limitations. Note also
that empirical studies reveal that the overwhelming majority of international arbitration awards
are complied with voluntarily. BORN, supra note31, § 22.01[A] n.18 (citing a 90% compliance rate
based on a collection of empirical studies by major arbitral institutions).
72 29 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 1994).
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arbitration had been conducted in Sweden.73 Similar situations occur in
other jurisdictions: Northern Sales Co. v. Compania Maritima Villa Nova S.A.
was a dispute between an American company and a Spanish company
arbitrated in London but decided by the Canadian statute of limitations
because Canada was the forum.74 In these cases, the law of a jurisdiction
with which an award creditor has no connection effectively deprived the
award creditor of rights secured through international arbitration.
The traditional choice of law approach has also undermined the
uniformity and predictability that the New York Convention sought to
bring to enforcement actions.75 Regarding uniformity, limitations periods
for enforcement of international arbitral awards vary widely across
countries, ranging from six months in China,76 to six years in England,77 to
thirty years in Austria.78 Because national courts characterize limitations
periods as “procedural” and therefore apply these local limitations periods,
attempts to enforce the exact same award will lead to different outcomes in
different countries, contrary to the uniform outcome sought by the
Convention. As to predictability, an award creditor will have difficultly
predicting whether the timeliness of its enforcement action will be governed
by national law or by the provisions of the Convention: fifty-three countries
treat statutes of limitations as procedural and therefore governed by local
law, while the remaining state-parties treat it as substantive and therefore
governed by the Convention.79 Compounding the confusion, even

73
74
75
76

656 F. Supp. 2d 550 (D. Md. 2009).
(1989), 29 F.T.R. 136 (Can. Man. Fed. Ct.), aff ’d, [1992] F.C. 550 (Can. Man. C.A.).
See supra notes 14–22 and accompanying text.
Zhōngguó de zhòngcái fă (中华人民共和国仲裁法) [Arbitration Law of China]
(promulgated by Order No. 31 of the President of the People's Republic of China, Aug. 31, 1994,
effective Sept. 1, 1995) 1994 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 134, Article 59.
77 This limitations period has to be constructed from multiple sources. English arbitration
legislation defers to the limitations period that applies to all civil actions. Arbitration Act 1996,
c. 23, § 13 (Eng.). The Limitations Act, in turn, establishes a six-year limitations period for
breaches of contract claims. Limitation Act 1980, c. 58, § 5 (Eng.). Finally, case law clarifies that
an enforcement action is actually a breach of contract claim, in which the award creditor asserts
that the award debtor breached an implied term in the arbitration agreement to comply with any
awards resulting from an arbitration pursuant to the agreement. Therefore, the six-year limitations
period that applies to all breach of contract claims applies to the enforcement of arbitral awards.
Agromet Motorimport Ltd. v. Maulden Eng’g Co. (Beds) [1985] WLR. 762 (QB) 763 (Eng.).
78 ALLGEMEINES BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [ABGB] [CIVIL CODE] JUSTIZGESETZSAMMLUNG
[JGS] No. 946/1816, as amended, § 1478 (Austria).
79 United Nations Comm’n Int’l Trade Law, Rep. on the Survey Relating to the Legislative
Implementation of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards on Its Forty-First Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/656/Add.1, at 11-24 (2008).
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jurisdictions that characterize time limits as “substantive” in a conflict of
laws context have treated them as “procedural” in enforcement actions.80
This unpredictability is apparent even within the United States. While
courts have all followed the three-year limitations period in the Federal
Arbitration Act, they have differed on the distinction between “substantive”
and “procedural” on another issue that could fit into either category:
whether an award debtor can raise a counterclaim in an enforcement
proceeding, or in other words, set-off its debt with a claim it has against the
creditor.81 Federal procedural law generally allows a party to raise
counterclaims unrelated to the main claim in the action,82 while the
Convention does not contain counterclaims (or the presence of debts owed
by the award creditor to the debtor) in its exclusive list of grounds for
refusal of enforcement.83 As a result, some courts have followed the federal
rules and agreed to hear counterclaims by award debtors,84 while others have
applied the Convention and refused to hear counterclaims.85
The foregoing survey of case law reveals that state-parties’ adherence to
the traditional choice of law approach has led to absurd results, as well as a
lack of uniformity and of predictability in determining which law governs
certain issues in enforcement actions. Arbitration practitioners and scholars
foresaw these problems: during the drafting of the Convention, some
delegates proposed including uniform procedural rules within the
80 Canada is an example of such a jurisdiction. See Yugraneft Corp. v. Rexx Mgmt. Corp.,
[2010] S.C.R. 649, 663-664 (Can.) (“The only material question is whether or not the competent
legislature intended to subject recognition and enforcement proceedings to a limitation period. If
it did, the limitation period in question will be construed as a ‘rule of procedure’ as that term is
understood under the Convention. How domestic law might choose to characterize such a time
limit, either in the abstract or in a conflict of laws context, is immaterial.” (emphasis added)).
81 See Maxi Scherer, The Award and the Courts, Set-off in International Arbitration (explaining
that a substantive concept of “set-off ” would define the rights—the amount of money due—
between the parties, while a procedural concept of set-off would only specify how the award debtor
could enforce its right to money owed to it by the claimant—by adjudicating it in pending
proceedings rather than arbitrating or litigating the claim separately), in AUSTRIAN YEARBOOK
ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 451, 454-55 (Gerold Zeiler et al. eds., 2015)
82 See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(A)-(B) (permitting a party to state as a counterclaim against an
opposing party any claim that does not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the main
claim in the action).
83 See New York Convention, supra note 2, art. V (detailing an exhaustive list of grounds for
refusal of enforcement that does not include counterclaims).
84 See, e.g., Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Mgmt., 517 F. Supp. 948, 963 (S.D. Ohio 1981);
Jugometal v. Samincorp, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 504, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
85 See, e.g., Wartsila Fin. OY v. Duke Capital LLC, 518 F.3d 287, 292-94 (5th Cir. 2008);
Compagnie Noga D’importation et D’exportation S.A. v. Russian Federation, 361 F.3d 676, 683
(2d Cir. 2004); Evergreen Sys., Inc. v. Geotech Lizenz AG, 697 F. Supp. 1254, 1257 (E.D.N.Y.
1988); Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft v. Overseas Motors, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 982 (E.D.
Mich. 1976).
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Convention that would be binding on all states—a solution ultimately rejected
as impractical.86 Others today call for harmonization in state-parties’ judicial
interpretation of Article III, even if it means that state-parties disregard
provisions of their local procedural laws.87
Accordingly, a more sustainable solution is to move away from the
traditional choice of law approach altogether, and eschew its rigid focus on
characterization of issues as “substantive” and “procedural.” Issues will
always lie in the middle of these amorphous fields and applying modern
choice of law doctrine would avoid the problem of distinguishing between
them. The following Part explores how American courts could apply three
different modern choice of law doctrines—interest analysis, Erie analysis,
and reverse-Erie analysis—to the choice of law problem contained within
the Federal Arbitration Act.
IV. MODERN APPROACHES
A. Interest Analysis
1. Summary of Approach
Developed by Brainerd Currie,88 interest analysis moves away from
jurisdiction-selecting rules and instead examines the content of the
competing laws in a choice of law problem.89 It involves two steps. A court

86 See U.N. Secretary-General, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, ¶ 7,
U.N. Doc E/2840, at 4 (Mar. 22, 1956) (studying “the possibility of drawing up a uniform law on
arbitration procedure”); Andreas Börner, Article III (“The most far-reaching proposal to solve this
potential problem [of different enforcement procedures] was to incorporate basic procedural rules
into the Convention. . . . The drafters [did not] pursue[] th[is] idea.”), in RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS: A GLOBAL COMMENTARY ON THE
NEW YORK CONVENTION 115, 117 (Herbert Kronke et al. eds., 2010); see also JAN VAN DEN
BERG, supra note 65, at 235 (“[The proposal for uniform procedural rules] led to a Babel-like
confusion at the [drafting] Conference.”).
87 See Emilia Onyema, Formalities of the Enforcement Procedure (Articles III and IV)
(“[H]armonising effort cannot no longer be regarded as ‘too far reaching’ but a necessity in
upholding the value of Convention awards in the resolution international commercial disputes.”),
in ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL
AWARDS: THE NEW YORK CONVENTION IN PRACTICE, supra note 6, at 597, 612; cf. Carolyn
Lamm, Comments on the Proposal to Amend the New York Convention (recalling that uniform internal
laws in each country and a treaty “incapable of divergent interpretations” were the main goals
pursued during the negotiations of the treaty), in ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS, supra note 6, at 689, 698.
88 See generally Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-laws Method,
25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958).
89 Cavers, supra note 53, at 197.
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must first ascertain the purpose or policy behind each of the competing laws.90
In constructing the policy, the court may assume that a jurisdiction enacts
laws primarily to benefit those who are domiciled within the jurisdiction.91
Second, the court must determine whether applying a given law to the case
would advance the policy behind the law.92 It must then apply that law
whose policy can be served without frustrating the policies of any of the
other competing laws.93 While interest analysis was envisioned to choose
between the laws of different sovereigns, it can also be applied to individual
laws within a single jurisdiction.94 Indeed, Currie himself highlighted the
parallels between the first step in interest analysis and statutory interpretation
of laws that do not involve multijurisdictional elements.95
Interest analysis therefore rejects the “unprincipled” characterization of
an issue as substantive or procedural, which creates the “thorniest choice of
law problems.”96 In abolishing the substance–procedure characterization,97
the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws maintained that
These characterizations, while harmless in themselves, have led some courts
into unthinking adherence to precedents that have classified a given issue as
“procedural” or “substantive” regardless of what purposes were involved in
the earlier classifications. . . . To avoid encouraging error of that sort, the
rules stated in this Chapter do not attempt to classify issues as “procedural”
or “substantive”. Instead they face directly the question of whether the
forum’s rule should be applied.98

Thus, rather than assuming that the forum will automatically apply its
rule of procedure just because it is a rule of procedure, interest analysis calls
90 See 2 HENRY M. HART, JR. & A LBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1111-14 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (discussing the purposive approach to statutory interpretation).
91 This assumption is known as the “selfish state” assumption. Currie, supra note 88, at 237, 254.
92 Id. at 233.
93 Id. at 253.
94 See Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, supra note 24, at 283 (“[T]he assumption that choice
of law problems arise only in multistate cases is erroneous.”).
95 See Currie, supra note 60, at 178 (“This process is essentially the familiar one of
construction or interpretation. Just as we determine by that process how a statute applies in time,
and how it applies to marginal domestic situations, so we may determine how it should be applied
to cases involving foreign elements in order to effectuate the legislative purpose.”); see also Lea
Brilmayer, The Other State’s Interests, 24 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 233, 239 (1991) (“[C]hoice of law is a
means to the end of furthering substantive values. Choice of law concerns the appropriate scope to
give a legal rule in the multistate context. This decision about scope is not qualitatively different
from other, domestic, issues of scope.”).
96 Twerski & Mayer, supra note 51, at 784.
97 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF L AWS § 122 (AM. LAW INST. 1969).
98 Id. § 122 cmt. b.
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for an inquiry into whether any interest of the forum would be advanced by
applying its procedural rule. Professors Twerski and Mayer explain:
A true interest analysis approach would examine each procedural rule to
determine whether a given state has an interest in having the rule applied.
In making the decision, a court would take into account the impact of such a
ruling on the operation of its own judicial machinery. . . . The recent trend
toward true interest analysis which focuses directly on whether a state has
an interest in having its so-called ‘procedural’ rule applied has much to
recommend it.99

Interest analysis immediately and steadily picked up steam among courts
across the country, displacing the traditional rules.100 Two features of this
new method are relevant to the present inquiry. First, courts have begun
using interest analysis, though implicitly, in determining whether American
law applies to events abroad. In Boumediene v. Bush, for instance, the
Supreme Court found that the purpose of the Suspension Clause—to
restrain the legislative and executive branches of government—would be
served by applying it to the detention of peoples in areas of de facto but not
de jure American sovereignty.101
The second notable development is that courts have employed the two-step
model of interest analysis in order to choose between statutes of limitations.
First, they have ascertained the purpose behind statutes of limitations,
generally identifying two rationales: (1) assuring judicial efficiency by
allocating scarce judicial resources to claims that are based on fresh rather
than stale evidence, and (2) giving defendants peace of mind.102 Under
Currie’s selfish-state assumption, statutes of limitations presumably aim to

99 Twerksi & Mayer, supra note 51, at 784 nn.15 & 16 (emphasis added).
100 See SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF- LAW

REVOLUTION:
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 44-45 (2009) (depicting through bar graphs states’ chronological
shift away from lex loci contractus and lex loci delicti rules of the traditional approach).
101 553 U.S. 723, 765-66 (2008) (“The test for determining the scope of [the Suspension
Clause] must not be subject to manipulation by those whose power it is designed to restrain.”
(emphasis added)).
102 See Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA
and Shady Grove, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 14 (2012) (“A limitations period does have a procedural
purpose, which is to allocate judicial resources to the litigation of fresh rather than stale claims.
And were that its only purpose, it might reasonably be classed as procedural and its assertion
limited to a particular forum. But it is also intended to give defendants peace of mind after a
prescribed period, and that is clearly a right intended to be conveyed regardless of forum—that is,
a substantive right.”).
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give only local defendants such peace of mind.103 A longer statute of
limitations can, “by negative implication,” also serve the purpose of
protecting (local) plaintiffs.104 Having ascertained the purposes behind the
statute of limitations, courts then examine whether its purpose will be
served by applying it in a particular case. Applying a shorter statute of
limitations advances its policy of repose only when the defendant is among
the class of people intended to be given repose—that is, a domicile of the
state with the short statute of limitations.105
Courts that have applied this two-step model have declined to apply the
forum’s statute of limitations in cases where both parties are foreign and the
acts giving rise to the dispute occurred abroad. In Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc.,
for instance, a North Carolina plaintiff was injured in North Carolina by an
exploding tire manufactured by a defendant corporation incorporated in
New Jersey but with its principal place of business abroad and business
spread throughout the country.106 The New Jersey Supreme Court declared
that it had “no substantial interest in the matter” and barred the action by
applying North Carolina’s statute of limitations.107 Similarly, in Farrier v.
May Department Stores Co., a Virginia plaintiff slipped and fell in the
Virginia branch of a corporation that did business in both Virginia and the
District of Columbia.108 The District of Columbia court applied Virginia’s
shorter statute of limitations, because doing so would serve the purpose
behind the statute of protecting Virginia’s defendants from stale claims.109
By contrast, applying the District of Columbia’s longer limitations period to
permit the suit to move forward would not further the plaintiff-protective
purposes behind that statute, because the plaintiff in this case was not from
the District of Columbia. The same court similarly declined to apply the
local limitations period in Cornwell v. C.I.T. Corp. of New York, in which a
Virginia plaintiff sued an airline’s owner and operator, from New York and
Tennessee, respectively, for a plane crash that occurred in Alaska.110
Declining to apply the forum’s limitation period, the District of Columbia
District court found that the forum “ha[d] no relationship to the instant
103 Allen Mass, Note, An Interest-Analysis Approach to the Selection of Statutes of Limitation, 49
N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 307 (1974) (“[T]he statutes of limitation in the controlling jurisdictions are
presumably designed to protect only local defendants.”).
104 Gary L. Milhollin, Interest Analysis and Conflicts Between Statutes of Limitation, 27
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 11 (1975).
105 Id. at 10.
106 305 A.2d 412, 413-14 (N.J. 1973).
107 Id. at 418.
108 357 F. Supp. 190, 191 (D.D.C. 1973).
109 Id.
110 373 F. Supp. 661, 662 (D.D.C. 1974).
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dispute aside from the fact that [the defendant owner] has an agent here
and, therefore, is subject to service of process.”111 The pattern is clear: a
forum has no interest in applying its statute of limitations to a case
involving foreign (out-of-state) parties arising out of events that occurred
abroad (in a different state).
Courts have thus applied interest analysis to both international events and
statutes of limitations. The next step, then, is to combine these two trends
and apply interest analysis to a case that involves both international events
and statutes of limitations: the enforcement of international arbitral awards.
2. Application of Interest Analysis to the New York Convention
and the Federal Arbitration Act
Engaging in the two-step process of interest analysis calls for limiting
the scope of the three-year limitations period in the Federal Arbitration
Act. As a first step, the purpose behind the limitations period must be
ascertained. As discussed above, the two purposes inherent in any
limitations period are (1) conserving judicial resources by refusing to
consider cases based on stale evidence, and (2) giving defendants repose.112
A key question when applying statutes of limitations is which
defendants are intended to be given repose, or in other words, whether the
selfish-state assumption should be made for enforcement actions. This
assumption would presume that the limitations period is designed to give
repose primarily to American award debtors. However, there is an argument
against this assumption: given the international subject matter of the
statute, perhaps Congress sought restrictive enforcement law in order to
induce foreign respondents to move their assets into the United States.
However, such a broad construction of state interests in this argument cuts
against Currie’s admonition that the purpose behind statutes should be
construed in a limited manner;113 it would be equally tenuous to propose
111 Id. at 665. Notably, the court was asked to decide between the forum’s statute of
limitations and the shorter one found in the 1929 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air. It thus faced a similar conflict, between local and treaty
law, as the conflict analyzed in this Comment. The court ultimately declined to reach the issue of
whether to apply the treaty’s period, however, instead asking the parties for supplemental briefing.
Id. The case then settled.
112 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
113 See Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754, 757
(1963) (“[T]o assert a conflict between the interests of the forum and the foreign state is a serious
matter; the mere fact that a suggested broad conception of a local interest will create conflict with
that of a foreign state is a sound reason why the conception should be re-examined, with a view to
a more moderate and restrained interpretation both of the policy and of the circumstances in
which it must be applied to effectuate the forum’s legitimate purpose.”).

2015]

The Limitations of Tradition

231

that a state enacted a long statute of limitations in order to better promote
accountability from foreign corporations in their interactions with the
state’s citizens.114 The selfish-state assumption is also bolstered by the
legislative history behind the limitations period in the Federal Arbitration
Act. The period was actually increased from one to three years, in
recognition of the fact that
[i]n many cases enforcement would normally be sought outside the United
States as a first step. An action would be filed [in the United States] only
after efforts to obtain enforcement in a foreign country had failed. It was,
therefore, essential to allow time for these initial enforcement efforts
outside the United States and the consensus was that 3 years is a reasonable
period in these circumstances.115

If anything, the limitations period is meant to protect foreign plaintiffs,
not foreign defendants. It may therefore be presumed that the statute of
limitations in the Federal Arbitration Act is designed to give repose
primarily to American award debtors.
The purpose behind the New York Convention’s indefinite limitations
period is comparably simple: it aims to protect award creditors116 by
allowing for the maximal enforcement of international arbitral awards.
The purposes behind the competing limitations periods are so
constructed such that the applicability of each period must be analyzed in a
given case. This Comment considers the paradigmatic case, involving wholly
foreign parties who arbitrated outside of the United States. These
characteristics describe over half of the enforcement actions that were
dismissed by American courts as time-barred.117 In such cases, applying the
three-year statute of limitations found in the Federal Arbitration Act would
serve none of the policies behind that statute, while applying the indefinite
limitations period of Article V of the Convention would serve the policy
behind that period.
First, applying the limitations period found in the Federal Arbitration
Act would not protect American courts from claims based on stale evidence,
because enforcement actions do not involve evidence that goes stale. As
114 See Mass, supra note 103, at 314 (warning that “[i]f courts are permitted to ferret out state
interests beyond the limited purposes underlying the statute of limitations, the result can only be
the kind of judicial free-for-all which conflicts of law doctrine is designed to avoid”).
115 S. REP. NO. 91-702, at 8 (1970).
116 See Milhollin, supra note 104, at 11 (stating that a longer statute of limitations contains an
implied policy of protecting plaintiffs).
117 See supra notes 71–74 (providing a survey of case law in which the limitations period was
dispositive).
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discussed, Article IV of the Convention limits the evidence that may be
considered by an enforcing court: the award creditor need supply only an
authenticated copy of the arbitration agreement and the arbitration award.118
The reliability of such evidence is unaffected by the passage of time.
Admittedly, the award debtor may raise one of the seven defenses
provided for in Article V and present supporting evidence.119 However,
none of these defenses in enforcement proceedings requires—or even
permits—the enforcing court to decide afresh the merits of the case: only
the arbitrators have the final say on the merits of the dispute.120 Rather, the
Article V defenses concern issues that are distinctly “ancillary,” relating
mostly to the procedural fairness of the arbitration.121 Consideration of such
ancillary issues would impose only a minimal burden on the judiciary.122
118
119

New York Convention, supra note 2, art. IV.
Note, however, that the defendants did not do so in the enforcement actions surveyed
supra notes 70–73. The only issue in those actions was whether or not the actions were time-barred.
120 See BORN, supra note 12, at § 17.04[E] (“It is an almost sacrosanct principle of
international arbitration that courts will not review the substance of arbitrators’ decisions
contained in foreign awards in recognition proceedings. Virtually nobody suggests that this
principle does not exist or should be abandoned . . . . The Convention does not contain any
exception permitting non-enforcement of an award simply because the arbitrators got their
decision wrong . . . .”). This fundamental difference between enforcement and conventional
litigation has prompted inquiries into whether other requirements in conventional litigation
should apply in enforcement litigation. See Maxi Scherer, Effects of Foreign Judgments Relating to
International Arbitral Awards: Is the ‘Judgment Route’ the Wrong Road?, 4 J. INT’L DISP.
SETTLEMENT 587, 606-07 (2013) (arguing that because enforcement actions do not involve a
review of the merits of the dispute, they should not have internationally preclusive effect); see also
James E. Berger & Charlene Sun, Personal Jurisdiction and the New York Convention, 28 INT’L
LITIG. Summer 2012, at 3 (suggesting that the need for an American court to have personal
jurisdiction over a defendant is lessened where the court will not determine the defendant’s rights
but rather give effect to a prior determination of the defendant’s rights by a competent tribunal);
John Fellas, Enforcing Foreign Arbitral Awards: Should Jurisdictional Defenses Apply?, 253 N.Y. L.J.
Feb. 6, 2015, at 1 (noting that the fairness concerns of the personal jurisdiction requirement are not
as applicable where the defendant’s liability is already fixed, and where the defendant could have
avoided enforcement litigation altogether by complying voluntarily with the arbitral award).
121 Scherer, supra note 120, at 606. See also Sovereign Participations Int’l S.A. v. Chadmore
Devs. Ltd., 24 Y.B. Com. Arb. 714, 718 (CA Lux. Jan. 28, 1999) (“The control by the
[enforcement] court essentially concerns the question whether the award has been rendered in
proceedings which respected due process . . . .”).
122 Indeed, a primary motivation behind the prohibition on substantive judicial review of
arbitral awards is to conserve scarce judicial resources. See Peter Bowman Rutledge, On the
Importance of Institutions: Review of Arbitral Awards for Legal Errors, 19 J. INT’L ARB. 81, 97 (2002)
(“Requiring a court to decide whether substantial evidence supports the arbitrator’s factual
findings or whether the arbitrator has committed legal error may require a much more timeconsuming and exhaustive review of the arbitration.”); Hans Smit, Contractual Modification of the
Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 147, 150 (1997) (“The extent to
which a court may review a decision made by an adjudicatory body is a function of a judgment as
to the extent to which public judicial resources should be made available for this purpose.”); Karen

2015]

The Limitations of Tradition

233

Therefore, applying the Federal Arbitration Act’s three-year limitations period
would not, or would only minimally, serve the goal of the limitations period of
conserving American judicial resources for claims based on fresh evidence.
Second, applying the three-year limit would not serve the policy of
giving repose to American defendants because the paradigmatic case does
not involve American defendants. By contrast, applying the indefinite
period of the Convention would obviously serve the creditor-protective
policies behind the indefinite period by allowing for maximal enforcement
of international arbitration awards.
Therefore, in the paradigmatic enforcement action involving foreign
parties and a foreign arbitration, interest analysis calls for applying the
indefinite limitations period of the Convention rather than the three-year
period of the Federal Arbitration Act. The purposes behind the Federal
Arbitration Act’s three-year period would not be served by the period’s
application; at best, its efficiency goals would be served only slightly. By
contrast, the pro-enforcement purposes behind the Convention’s indefinite
limitations period would be completely vindicated through application of
the treaty.
B. Erie Analysis
In determining how to resolve the conflict of laws present in
enforcement actions, American federal courts may additionally look to the
Erie doctrine. There are many parallels between the Erie doctrine and the
Convention. Both the Convention and the Erie doctrine respond to conflicts
of laws by adopting the traditional approach. Moreover, they both seek to
avoid the same problems created by the application of federal law in both
conflicts: (1) the use of federal courts for purposes for which they were not
intended by the statutes that granted them jurisdiction, and (2) forum
shopping by defendants. Federal courts have developed the Erie doctrine to
move beyond the traditional substance–procedure characterization. Given
the parallels between Erie and the Convention, they should therefore do the
same for the latter.
A. Lorang, Comment, Mitigating Arbitration’s Externalities: A Call for Tailored Judicial Review 59
UCLA L. REV. 218, 221 (2011) (“Resistance to substantive judicial review arises in part because it
drains judicial resources and makes arbitration slower and more expensive for the parties
involved.”). Calls for the elimination of substantive judicial review of arbitral awards in
jurisdictions that do not fully embrace the Convention similarly rest on considerations of judicial
efficiency. See Cliff Manjiao Chi, Domestic Arbitration in China: A Comparative Perspective
(“[S]ubstantive review of domestic awards not only seriously harms the efficiency of arbitration
but also wastes limited judicial resources, since such review constitutes a de facto ‘appeal’ or ‘retrial’
of the case.”), in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA 45, 79 (Michael J. Moser ed., 2012).
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Both the Convention and the Erie doctrine responded to conflict of law
situations by adopting the traditional approach. Under the Erie doctrine, the
conflict is between state law and federal common law.123 The doctrine
initially solved this problem by requiring a federal court sitting in diversity
to apply state law to substantive issues and federal law to procedural
issues.124 The Convention addresses conflicts between international law and
federal law using a similarly traditional approach, requiring a federal court
hearing an enforcement action to apply international (treaty) law to
substantive issues and national (federal) law to procedural issues.125
Thus, both the doctrine and the treaty adopted the traditional approach in
order to limit the application of federal law and the problems the application
of federal law would cause. Applying federal law would, first, undermine the
purpose underlying the grant of federal (national court) jurisdiction, thereby
using federal courts for purposes for which they were not intended to be used.
Second, it would encourage forum shopping by defendants.
Applying federal law over state and treaty law would undermine the
purpose of diversity and enforcement jurisdiction respectively. The grant of
diversity jurisdiction126 was meant to give litigants access to federal courts,
not to federal law.127 It was not meant to alter state law as the decisional
rule. Similarly, the Convention sought to “mobilise[] national courts,”128 not
national law.129 In countries where the treaty is not self-executing, domestic
statutes that grant national courts enforcement jurisdiction130 pursuant to
123 Where the federal law is a statute or a rule promulgated pursuant to a statute, it prevails
over the state law in accordance with the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (holding that state law cannot
displace a valid and pertinent Federal Rule of Civil Procedure).
124 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938); see also Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465.
125 FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
supra note 63, para. 1671.
126 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012) (granting federal courts jurisdiction over cases involving
citizens of two different states).
127 See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 112 (1945) (“Congress afforded out-of-State
litigants another tribunal, not another body of law.”); Robert Allen Sedler, The Erie Outcome Test
as a Guide to Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 813, 819 (1962)
(“The Erie doctrine can be understood only in light of the reasoning upon which diversity
jurisdiction is based. Diversity jurisdiction is intended to prevent local bias against an out-of-state
litigant by insuring control of the trial by a federal judge who enjoys life tenure and is free from
local pressures.”). But see Baxter, supra note 48, at 36-41 (analyzing legislative history of the
diversity grant of jurisdiction, and concluding that it was indeed meant to guard against biased
local law).
128 Reisman, supra note 16, at 1.
129 See supra notes 16, 22, 86, 87 and accompanying text.
130 See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (“[The New York Convention] shall be enforced in United
States courts . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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the treaty were likewise meant to give arbitrating parties access to national
courts, not to national law. Neither the treaty nor implementing legislation
sought to supplant treaty law as the rule of decision.131 Thus, applying
federal law in both contexts results in federal courts being used for purposes
for which they were not intended.
Moreover, applying federal law over state and treaty law would
encourage forum shopping by defendants. In the Erie context, it would
incentivize defendants to remove cases to federal court in order to avail
themselves of more favorable federal general common law.132 In the
enforcement context, it would incentivize defendants to move assets133 to
the United States in order to avail themselves of favorable federal
enforcement law.134 Thus, both the Erie doctrine and the Convention sought
to respond to the same problems by limiting the application of federal
(national) law through the adoption of a traditional choice of law method.
The Erie doctrine, however, eventually departed from this traditional
method. The Supreme Court stopped characterizing competing state and
federal common laws as “substantive” or “procedural.”135 Instead, it began
analyzing whether application of the federal rule would frustrate the

131 For a discussion of the legislative history of the Federal Arbitration Act, see discussion
supra pp. 217-18.
132 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938) (noting the “grave
discrimination” that results when non-citizen defendants remove cases to federal court and thus
prevent citizens from enjoying state-created rights); Roosevelt, supra note 102, at 6 (“[F]orum
shopping is law shopping . . . .”); see also Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Brandeis, Erie, and the New Deal
“Constitutional Revolution,” 26 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 258, 272-73 (2001) (“Since the late nineteenth
century, corporations operating in interstate commerce had regularly . . . exploited diversity
removal jurisdiction to impose heavy legal and extra-legal burdens on individuals who sued
them. . . . Abolishing the general federal common law would eliminate a major incentive for intra-state
forum shopping and reduce the utility of a variety of popular manipulative tactics.” (footnotes omitted)).
133 See supra note 68 (recounting that enforcement will be sought primarily where the award
debtor’s assets are located); see also Martin L. Roth, Note, Recognition by Circumvention: Enforcing
Foreign Arbitral Awards as Judgments Under the Parallel Entitlements Approach, 92 CORNELL L. REV.
573, 587-88 (2007) (“In the context of foreign arbitral awards, the statute of limitations defines a
time lapse after which the [award debtor] may feel secure that its assets lie outside the reach of the
award holder. Such a provision allows [award debtors] subject to arbitral awards to make rational
decisions about the disposition of their assets.”).
134 It is worth noting that the Convention seeks to eliminate forum shopping by defendants/
award debtors in other contexts, such as the annulment of awards. Article V(1)(e) states that an
award debtor may seek to annul an award only in “the country in which, or under the law of which,
that award was made.” New York Convention, supra note 2, art. V(1)(e); cf. BORN, supra note 12,
§ 16.02[A][2][ii]-[B] (confirming that most courts and arbitration specialists interpret this language as an
explicit limit on the forum in which annulment may be sought by the award debtor).
135 Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (“And so the question is not whether a
statute of limitations is deemed a matter of ‘procedure’ in some sense.”).
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“policies underlying the Erie rule”136—namely, whether application of the
federal rule would encourage forum shopping by defendants. In doing so,
the Court developed a uniformity test or “outcome-determination” test: a
federal common law rule would not be applied if it “significantly affect[ed]
the result of a litigation” such that it would encourage ex ante forum
shopping by the defendant.137 In Guaranty Trust, the Court refused to apply
a federal limitations period pursuant to this test, and instead applied the
state law limitations period.138
Courts should do the same in the enforcement context. That is, where
application of a federal (national) law would significantly affect the result of
the enforcement action, such as to encourage ex ante forum shopping by
award debtors, enforcing courts should decline to apply the federal
(national) law and instead apply the rule in the Convention. Applying this
test would require applying the Convention’s indefinite limitations period,
rather than the three-year period in the Federal Arbitration Act.
At first blush, Erie and the New York Convention admittedly bear little
resemblance to one another: the former deals with specific American
constitutional law issues while the latter concerns international ones.
However, there is nothing in the Erie doctrine that confines its application
to the narrow realm of federal–state conflicts.139 Indeed, given the fact that
the doctrine and Convention seek to avoid identical problems attendant to
the application of federal law in federal courts, it is only logical that the
New York Convention should evolve just as the Erie doctrine has, from a
136
137
138

Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965).
Guar. Trust, 326 U.S. at 109.
Id. at 110. Professor Roosevelt has suggested that rather than expanding the scope of the
state law statute of limitations, the Court in Guaranty Trust was actually making federal common
law that incorporated the state law statute of limitations. Roosevelt, supra note 102, at 15. This is
analogous to the preclusion context, in which a federal court sitting in diversity applies federal
common law that incorporates the law of the state in which the rendering court sits. See Semtek
Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 506, 508-09 (2001) (holding that a federal court
sitting in diversity determines the preclusive effect of a federal court judgment using federal
common law, but for the purposes of intra-state uniformity, the federal common law should
incorporate the law of the state in which the rendering court sat); see also Stephen B. Burbank,
Semtek, Forum Shopping, and Federal Common Law, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1027-28, 1038
(2002) (“applaud[ing]” the Semtek Court for accepting the “most controversial” but ultimately
correct solution).
139 Sedler, for example, argues that the outcome-determination test should apply to
horizontal conflict of law situations (i.e., those between states). He reasons that when a forum
decides to refer to an external law and incorporate that law as a model, it has decided that it is a
forum of convenience and has no interest in the outcome of the litigation. Therefore, it should
incorporate by reference “as much of the law of the locus as is likely to bear materially on the
ultimate outcome irrespective of whether the matter is analytically characterized as one of
substance or procedure.” Sedler, supra note 127, at 821, 824.
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traditional conflict of law method to a more discerning outcome-determination
test. This would ensure the uniformity that motivated the very creation of
the Convention.
C. Reverse-Erie Analysis
The preceding two approaches both entail restricting the scope of the
statute of limitations found in the Federal Arbitration Act so that it does
not apply to certain enforcement proceedings. Interest analysis achieves this
restriction by interpreting the statute of limitations according to its
purpose, while the Erie doctrine achieves this restriction by interpreting the
limitations period according to the outcome-determination test. Both
approaches avoid a direct clash between the federal limitations period and
the one in the Convention because the latter emerges as the only limitations
period whose scope covers the facts of an enforcement action. In the words of
Currie, the preceding two methods produce (or reveal) a “false” conflict.140
This need not be the case. Rather than interpreting away the scope of
either of the limitations periods, federal courts can merely accept that both
limitations periods cover the facts of an enforcement action and that they
conflict. To resolve this true conflict, courts can look for a rule of priority to
decide among the conflicting limitations periods.141
The conflict between a federal statute of limitations and one found in a
treaty is analogous to the little-discussed reverse-Erie problem.142 This
problem arises when a state court is hearing a federal cause of action and
confronts a situation in which a state law and the federal law conflict—in
other words, a conflict between the law of the court of the hierarchically
lower jurisdiction (state law) and the law of the hierarchically higher
jurisdiction on which the claim before the court is based (federal law).143
The parallel in the enforcement context is that national courts are the courts
of the hierarchically lower jurisdiction; they are hearing a claim—for
enforcement—arising out of the law of a hierarchically higher jurisdiction—

140 See Brainerd Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the
Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9, 10 (1958) (describing a false conflict as one where the
policies of only one law are implicated by a factual situation).
141 Roosevelt, supra note 102, at 11.
142 See Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (noting that
the topic is “strangely ignored by most scholars”).
143 Omar K. Madhany, Comment, Towards a Unified Theory of “Reverse-Erie,” 162 U. PA. L.
REV. 1261, 1262 (2014).
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international law as embodied by the New York Convention.144 The table
below captures the parallels between the two situations:
Table 1: The Reverse-Erie Problem
Ordinary Context

Arbitral Enforcement Context

Court

State Court

Federal Court

Claim Arises out of

Federal Law

International Law

Conflicting Law

State Law

Federal Law

State courts considering reverse-Erie cases have dealt with them in
myriad ways.145 Intermittent guidance has been provided by the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, which is the only federal court that
can consider a reverse-Erie problem on a writ of certiorari from a state court
of last resort.146 The Supreme Court has heard four such cases. In three out
of the four cases, it has chosen federal law over the conflicting state law.147
In doing so, it has looked to the federal statutes and the U.S. Constitution

144 In terms of its place in American domestic law, international law is theoretically on the
same footing as other statutes. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889)
(holding that treaties are of no higher dignity than acts of Congress). In practice, however, the
Supreme Court has treated international law similarly to the Constitution in terms of its superior
relationship to federal statutes. Just as the Court has instructed lower courts to interpret statutes
in a way that implicates the Constitution only as a last resort, see Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth.,
297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[I]f a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or
general law, the Court will decide only the latter.”), it has also instructed lower courts to interpret
statutes inconsistently with international law only as a last resort, see Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“It has also been observed that an act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains.”). Therefore, this Comment treats international law analogously to the
Constitution, as a source of law hierarchically superior to federal statutes.
145 See Madhany, supra note 143, at 1305 (surveying three trends in state court treatment of
the problem and relevant cases on the issue).
146 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2012) (“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of
a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of
certiorari . . . .”).
147 See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 153 (1988) (prioritizing section 1983 over a Wisconsin
notice of claim requirement); Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 36061 (1952) (prioritizing the Federal Employers’ Liability Act over an Ohio law that permitted issues
of fraud in the procuring of a liability release to be determined by a judge rather than a jury);
Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1949) (prioritizing the Federal Employers’
Liability Act over a state court rule that would construe pleadings in favor of the defendant). But
see Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 922-23 (1997) (prioritizing an Idaho rule prohibiting
interlocutory appeals over section 1983).
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as rules of priority. The conventional wisdom148 is that the rule of priority
that the Court employed is the Supremacy Clause in the Constitution.149
Certainly the Court’s explicit or implicit references to preemption would
support this view.150 Others, however, argue that the Court was not simply
applying federal statutes as written, but rather was making federal common
law to fill gaps in these statutes in order to effectuate federal policies.151
Under this view, it was this judge-made common law that displaced state
law as the rule of decision, and the authority for the Court to create such
displacing federal common law came from the Rules of Decision Act.152
Regardless of whether the Court (and state court judges applying the
Court’s holdings on remand) followed the Supremacy Clause or the Rules
of Decision Act, the bottom line is that it looked to a rule of priority to

148 See Clermont, supra note 142, at 5 (“[A]nalysts most often start from preemption.”
(emphasis omitted)); cf. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 3.5, at 214 (4th ed.
2003) (“[S]tate courts generally need not follow federal procedures when hearing federal law
claims. However, state courts must do so if Congress specifies the procedure for a particular
matter.”); Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: “Actual” Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1743, 1785-86 (1992) (referencing Felder in discussing the distinction between reverse-Erie cases and
the rest of the supremacy and conflict preemption cases).
149 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”).
150 See Johnson, 520 U.S. at 918 (“[O]ur normal presumption against pre-emption is
buttressed by the fact that the [state rule is] neutral . . . .”); Felder, 487 U.S. at 138 (“The question
before us today, therefore, is essentially one of pre-emption: . . . does the [state notice-of-claim]
requirement . . . ‘stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress?’” (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))); Dice, 342 U.S. at
363 (holding that the right to trial by jury was “too substantial a part of the rights” afforded by the
federal cause of action to be classified as a “local rule of procedure”); Brown, 338 U.S. at 296 (“[It
is] our duty . . . to determine whether petitioner has been denied a right of trial granted him by
Congress. This federal right cannot be defeated by the forms of local practice.” (emphasis added)).
151 Clermont, supra note 142, at 11 (“The federal court is not determining whether preexisting
federal law already covers the question . . . . Instead, the court must look at federalism policies
somehow to decide if federal law should govern. If so, . . . the court then must . . . . extend federal
law by creating specialized federal common law . . . .”); Madhany, supra note 143, at 1282-83 (noting
that the Supremacy Clause directs judges to prioritize federal law that already exists, but not to
create it).
152 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012) (“The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or
treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as
rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.”
(emphasis added)). Madhany argues that the federal statutes that are in conflict with state law in
reverse-Erie cases “require” courts to create and supply federal common law as rules of decision, in order
to effectuate vital federal policies contained in the federal statutes. Madhany, supra note 143, at 1282.
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solve these conflicts between federal and state law.153 And, both the above
rules of priority were designed to effectuate the policies of the hierarchically
higher—federal—law.
In the enforcement context, federal courts—the hierarchically lower
jurisdiction—should likewise look to a rule of priority that strives to
effectuate the policies behind the hierarchically higher law—the
international law embodied in the New York Convention. This rule of
priority may be found in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which states that treaty law prevails over domestic law.154 Given
that Congress only unwittingly violated the New York Convention,155 it
would behoove federal courts to choose a rule of priority156 that would allow
maximal fulfillment of both international law and congressional intent.

153 Clermont mounts a realist critique of this view, arguing that the Supreme Court’s
references to preemption were “wooden” and conclusory, and masked a complicated choice of law
methodology actually being employed by the Court. As a result, the reverse-Erie problem has
“morphed from classic preemption into a choice of law that requires an Erie-like judicial
methodology.” Clermont, supra note 142, at 33. Notably, faced with conflicting statutes of
limitations, “the state courts come out the same way on reverse-Erie that federal courts do in the
Erie setting, with each deferring to the other sovereign.” Id. at 30 (footnotes omitted). Such
parallelism would be appropriate in the enforcement context as well; it would result in application of
the statute of limitations of the treaty (or of the “international sovereign”). See supra Section IV.B.
154 See Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal
law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”). While the United States is not party to the
Vienna Convention, it considers many of its provisions to be codifications of binding customary
international law. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm [http://perma.cc/R4C5-HA9S] (last visited Sept.
19, 2015) (“The United States considers many of the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties to constitute customary international law on the law of treaties.”); see also Mora v.
New York, 524 F.3d 183, 196 n.19 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The Department of State considers the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties an authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice.”). At
least some members of the Court consider Article 27 to constitute customary international law, as
evidenced by their citation to the Article in a dissent. See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548
U.S. 331, 390-91 (2006) (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens and Souter, JJ., dissenting) (“[Breard v.
Greene’s] statement of a presumption that only a treaty provision with a clear and express
statement can trump the procedural rules of the forum State, is in tension with more fundamental
interpretive rules in this area. . . . [S]ee also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened
for signature May 23, 1969, Art. 27 . . . .”).
155 See supra Part II.
156 Kramer has suggested that a rule prioritizing substance over procedure should apply even
in conflicts between laws from hierarchically equal jurisdictions. See Kramer, Rethinking Choice of
Law, supra note 24, at 328 (“[W]hen conflicts arise in domestic cases between substantive and
procedural laws, the usual solution is to favor the substantive rule.”). While this Comment urges
courts to reject the outdated substance–procedure characterization, such a rule of priority would
have the same effect as that of the Vienna Convention: it would prioritize the substantive
provisions of the New York Convention over the procedural rules of the enforcing state-parties.
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Table 2: The Reverse-Erie Problem Solved
Ordinary Context

Arbitral Enforcement Context

Court

State Court

Federal Court

Claim Arises out of

Federal Law

International Law

Conflicting Law

State Law

Federal Law

Rule of Priority to

Supremacy Clause or

Vienna Convention on

decide conflict

Rules of Decision Act

the Law of Treaties
Article 27

Law that takes priority

Federal Law

*

*

International Law

*

Thus, all three of the modern choice of law approaches analyzed above—
interest analysis, Erie analysis, and reverse-Erie analysis—would result in
the same practical outcome. They would each apply the indefinite
limitations period contained in Article V of the New York Convention,
rather than the three-year limitations period in the Federal Arbitration Act,
to enforcement actions involving foreign parties and a foreign arbitration.
As shown above, this outcome contains many benefits. It effects maximum
fulfillment of the purposes behind each limitations period; it ensures that
national courts are not used for purposes for which they were not intended;
it removes the incentives for award debtors to engage in forum shopping by
removing their assets to countries with restrictive enforcement legislation;
and finally it effectuates the policies of the hierarchically higher jurisdiction.
Despite the fact that each approach leads to the same practical outcome,
two considerations should drive American judges to employ interest analysis
over the other approaches. First, unlike Erie and reverse-Erie analyses, which
are uniquely American doctrines, interest analysis—the idea that when
choosing between laws, a court should apply the law whose policies can be
served without frustrating the policies of any other potentially applicable
laws—is generalizable across jurisdictions internationally. Therefore, if
American courts would like to set an example for their foreign colleagues in
adopting a choice of law approach that restores uniformity and predictability
to the enforcement of arbitral awards, interest analysis would be the ideal
approach. Second, interest analysis is the least controversial domestically. The
Erie doctrine is subject to constant reinterpretation, and the explicit
subordination of national to international law entailed by reverse-Erie analysis
may not be palatable to some litigants before American courts.
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CONCLUSION
The New York Convention was enacted to bring international
uniformity and predictability to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
Its ability to achieve its purpose is threatened by the choice of law problem
contained within its provisions, and the use by national courts of the
traditional choice of law method to resolve this problem. Not only has the
use of the traditional method undermined the uniformity and predictability
sought by the Convention, but it has also led to absurd results in which an
award creditor is effectively deprived of her rights by the law of a country
with which neither she nor the arbitration that produced the rights she is
trying to enforce has any connection. To fulfill the Convention’s purpose
and avoid these absurd results, courts should adopt modern choice of law
approaches to solve the choice of law problem within the New York
Convention and national implementing legislation, such as the Federal
Arbitration Act in the United States. For American judges, interest analysis,
Erie analysis, and reverse-Erie analysis are possible modern approaches. All
would result in the application of the indefinite limitations period contained
in Article V of the Convention, rather than the three-year period in the
Federal Arbitration Act, to enforcement actions between foreign parties
involving a foreign arbitral award.
A compelling area for further inquiry would be other issues that lie on
the border between “substance” and “procedure,” and for which applying
traditional choice of law approaches is similarly ill-suited. One such issue
would be the admissibility of counterclaims in an enforcement
proceeding.157 As international transactions become more multifaceted and
long-term, parties increasingly develop reciprocal claims against one
another. Ascertaining a predictable and sensible method by which to choose
between a national law, which permits them to bring counterclaims, and
Article V of the Convention, which does not, is the next, necessary step in
preserving the integrity of what truly may be the most effective piece of
international commercial legislation ever enacted.158

157
158

See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text.
See Mustill, supra note 7, at 49.

